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This dissertation reports the results of a research project concerning expectation
states theory (EST; Berger, Conner & Fisek, 1974; Berger, Fisek, Norman &
Zelditch, 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz & Zeldítch, 1980; Berger, Wagner & Zelditch,
198-5; Berger, Webster, Ridgeway, & Rosenholtz, 19t3ó). EST provides an explanation
for the emergence of influence differentials in small groups. After an introductory
chapter consisting of a short review of EST literature and the discussions it evoked,
three studies are reported describing six experiments that were performed as part of
the project. Although each of these studies had its own specific purpose and
hvpotheses, the findings displayed a number of agreements across experiments that
called for f irrther discussion. For this reason, a final, general discussi<ln is presented
in the fifth and last chapter.
Thus, the first chapter involves EST itself. In this chapter f irst the theoretical
starting-points of EST are described. EST states that influence differentials come
about because group members develop expectations about the relative competence of
each group member. Moreover, it is assumed that each group member wil l behave in
accordance with their (performance) expectations. The larger the, estimated,
difference in relative competence, the larger EST expects the influence differentials
to be. Influence differentials are mostly expressed in the degree to which someone li
influenced by another person, which is either called influence acceptance or rejection
of influence. According to EST people do not base their expectations regarding their
telative competence solely on factual or objective information about their
competencies, but also on a number of characteristics (such as sex, race, and
occupational status) that are associated with status, power and prestige in the larger
society. For this reason, these characteristics are called status characteistics.
In the many investigations with regard to EST two major research interests may be
indicated. First, a number of studies were performed in order to establish whether or
not certain characteristics may function as status characteristics. In this field of
research it was found that a large number of apparently irrelevant characteristics did
establish influence differentials. Besides characteristic such as sex and race, which
ale often associated with status, characteristics such as ethnicity, physical
attractiveness, military rank, occupational status, age, and educational status also
appeared to affect influence differentials. EST's second major research interest
pertains to the question how people process information about their status position on
more than one status characteristic. EST's stance in this "combining - balancing" issue
is that people wil l combine separate pieces of status information. Combining results
tn an aggregated "expectation state," which in its turn determines inflr.rence
differentials. People are said to be "balancing" status information when the
participants take only one piece of status information into account, hence, when they
make a selection from all available status information. It is assumed that balancing
occurs out of self-presentational motivations, suggesting that people only employ
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status information reflecting their own status superiority. However, in EST :
predominantly support for the "combining hypothesis" has been found.
Both EST's basic premises and the way EST was investigated in har
criticized. It seems to be meaningful to distinguish two subjects of criticism. '
of these refers to the basic role performance expectations play in EST. I
Ofshe (1981) and, for instance, Knottnerus (1988) question the importan
attributes to these performance expectations, that is, being the sole determ
infl uence differentials.
A second criticism concerns the way status differentials emerge. EST assut
this emergence occurs in a cooperative way: each group member is believed tt
that the best group's performance will be achieved when everybody tries to i
each others' competence as correctly as possible. Moreover, it is assun
everyone will pursue making correct competence appraisals and will attr
behave in accordance with them (i.e. by accepting more influence as they
their fellow group members to be more competent). Mazur (1985) states that
the time status differentials do emerge in a cooperative fashion, but that t
often based on dominant behavior or a competit ion for status as well. Mazur
that status competit ions predominantly occur when people's relative status I
are unclear.
In the research project six experiments were performed. In doing so,
attempted both to do justice to EST and to take into account the criticism ,
The six experiments were all performed in the same experimental settinl
participants in the experiments (subjects) were each in a separate cubicle e
with a response terminal. It was suggested that they would cooperate with on
other participants (who was referred to as their partner). They were confron
a highly ambiguous task, on which bogus performance feedback was provide
feedback about their relative competence constituted the (often employec
manipulation. By showing responses on subjects' monitors that, seemingly
from their partner, diverged from the subjects' own responses, and by offeri
an opportunity to change their answers, their degree of influence acceptance ,
measured. In one study also subjects' influence exertion was assessed (chi
For this measure it was counted how often subjects gave an answer first, wl
themselves could determine whether they gave an answer first or second.
In chapter 2 two experiments are reported that address the issue
performance expectations are the only or even the most important detern
influence differentials. In this chapter first a number of studies are discusst
suggest that individuals are reluctant to accept influence from their fello
members, even in task-oriented, cooperative groups. It is argued that t
influence, giving up one's own opinion, can be considered as an "ego cost." N
it is stated that these costs wil l only be endured when there is some indica
accepting influence will be rewarding, that is, when the ego costs are compen
by rewards. The validity of this reasoning was investigated in two experiment
Sutrtrnary
In the first experiment this occurred by comparing conditions in which subjects had
incomplete information about their relative competence and conditions in which
subjects did have complete status information. As it is uncertain that influence
acceptance wil l be rewarding when people have incomplete information about their
competencies, it was predicted that influence acceptance would be lower in these
conditions as compared to conditions in which subjects had equal status. This
prediction was conflrmed. The most interesting result of this study was that when
subjects' own status position was unknown, they behaved in the same way as subjects
who had high status, whereas when their partner's status position was unknown, they
behaved as if their partner had a low status position.
The second experiment of this study was performed in order to underpin the "ego
costs compensation" hypothesis. In this experiment it was investigated to what degree
certain structural properties of the situation, which should affect the degree of
influence acceptance according to the "ego costs compensation" hypothesis, really did
so. The participants were confr<lnted with a situation in which a) they either had to
give a preliminary answer before their "real, definit ive answer," or not, b) they either
had the prospect of getting rewards for giving correct answers or not, and c) the ego
costs that were associated with accepting influence were described as either high or
low. The results were in agreement with the "ego costs compensation" hypothesis,
since influence acceptance was rather low in general, but particularly when subjects
had committed themselves to their preliminary answer while no rewards had been
mentioned. Influence acceptance was also lower when accepting influence was
associated with high ego costs rather than with low ego costs.
In chapter 3 an experiment is reported that pertains to the "combining - balancing"
issue. In this experiment it was investigated how subjects' behavior changed as a
consequence of the repeated provision of information about their relative
competence. Subjects made three tasks. In each one of them influence acceptance
was measured. In the first task subjects did not have any information about their
competence. In the second task they knew that theír performance was either better
or worse than their partners' performance. Then they received a second piece of
status information, which was either consistent or inconsistent with the first. Hence,
in the third task subjects knew that they had performed better in both former tasks,
worse in both tasks, or better in one, and worse in the other task.
There were several notable results. For instance, it appeared that subjects'
influence acceptance in the first task (in which subjects had no status information)
was an important predictor of their degree of influence acceptance in the later tasks.
This result shows that subjects behaved in a rather consistent way. It does not imply,
however, that information indicating subjects had higher competence had the same
effect as information indicating they had lower competence. After the provision of
status information subjects who had low competence did not start to accept more
influence, whereas subjects who appeared to have higher competence clearly did








































subjects who had received consistent (in fact, even identical) status information,
started to accept more influence (low status subjects) or less influence (high status
subjects) relative to in the foregoing tests.
In chapter 4 three experiments are reported. This study had two objectives, while
the assessment of influence exerÍion was central. EST states that expectation
differentials do not only determine influence acceptance, but other types of status-
related behaviors, such as influence exertion, as well. Moreover, it is hypothesized
that these types of behavior are strongly correlated. In each of the three experiments
both influence acceptance and influence exertion were measured, while the relation
between these variables was calculated as well. The most notable result with regard
to this correlation was that it was low to moderate in each of the three experiments.
A second objective of the study was to determine effects of size and stability of
status difference on both dependent variables. For these factors some interesting
results were found as well. First, the status effect appeared to be independent of the
size of the status differentials. Thus, effects of small and large status differences were
of equal strength. Secondly, stability of the status differentials (it was suggested that
subjects' status position was either likely to change or unlikely to change) affected
influence acceptance and influence exertion differently. For influence acceptance it
was found, as expected, that the difference between the high and low status conditions
was smaller under unstable conditions than in stable situations. For influence
exertion subjects who had an unstable status position tried to exert more influence
than subjects who had a stable positon.
The fact that influence acceptance and influence exertion had a different meaning
for subjects appears both from the low correlation between the measures, as from the
differential effect of stabil ity on both measures. In the discussion on this issue, this
difference in meaning is retraced to a motivational difference: although subjects
usually are cooperatively oriented, they may have regarded influence exertion as a
means to acquire status.
In the final discussion (chapter 5) the implications of our findings for EST are
examined. Central in this discussion is the observtion that a number of findings are
not in agreement with EST's premise that performance expectations determine
influence differentials. The results clearly indicate that other factors are important as
well, in particular people's inclination to accept influence, and the importance people
attach to performance expectations. Nevertheless, it may be argued that these results
supplement EST rather than invalidating it.
The latter conclusion does not apply to the results referring to the motives
underlying people's influence behavior. While EST assumes that people are
motivated to develop expectation states that are correct, in order to achieve favorable
group outcomes, the findings in this dissertation seem to indicate that even people
who have a cooperative task-orientation have several motives to exert or to accept
influence. The reluctance to accept influence, as attempting to attain a higher status
Summary
position may be considered as examples of such motives. In addition, it seems that
such motives are particularly involved when there is uncertainty about people's status
position, that is, when it is possible that status positions will change. with this the
findings contribute to the (predominantly) theoretical discussions about the validity of
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